DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTINGTHE FAITH IN EUROPE TODAY (From Communio Magazine (#38 Winter 2011)


  • Joseph Ratzinger •
  • We can give a meaningful answer to
    the questions raised only if we . . . are
    able to express the logic of the Faith in its
    integrity, the good sense and reasonableness
    of its view of reality and life.”
    As bishops who bear responsibility for the faith of the Church in our
    countries, we ask ourselves where especially do the difficulties lie
    which people have with the faith today and how can we rightly
    reply to them.
    We need no extensive search in order to answer the first of
    these questions. There exists something like a litany of objections to
    the practice and teaching of the Church, and nowadays its regular
    recitation has become like the performance of a duty for
    Difficulties Confronting the Faith in Europe Today 729
    progressive-thinking Catholics. We can ascertain the principal
    elements of this litany: the rejection of the Church’s teaching about
    contraception, which means the placing upon the same moral level
    of every kind of means for the prevention of conception upon
    whose application only individual “conscience” may decide; the
    rejection of every form of “discrimination” as to homosexuality and
    the consequent assertion of a moral equivalence for all forms of
    sexual activity as long as they are motivated by “love” or at least do
    not hurt anyone; the admission of the divorced who remarry to the
    Church’s sacraments; and the ordination of women to the priesthood.
    As we can see, there are quite different issues linked together
    in this litany. The first two claims pertain to the field of sexual
    morality; the second two to the Church’s sacramental order. A
    closer look makes it clear, however, that these four issues, their
    differences notwithstanding, are very much linked together. They
    spring from one and the same vision of humanity within which
    there operates a particular notion of human freedom. When this
    background is borne in mind, it becomes evident that the litany of
    objections goes even deeper than it appears at first glance.
    What does this vision of humanity, upon which this litany
    depends, look like on closer scrutiny? Its fundamental characteristics
    are as diffuse as the claims which derive from it, and so it can be
    easily traced. We find our starting point in the plausible assertion
    that modern man would find it difficult to relate to the Church’s
    traditional sexual morality. Instead, it is said, he has come to terms
    with his sexuality in a differentiated and less confining way and thus
    urges a revision of standards which are no longer acceptable in the
    present circumstances, no matter how meaningful they may have
    been under past historical conditions. The next step, then, consists
    in showing how we today have finally discovered our rights and the
    freedom of our conscience and how we are no longer prepared to
    subordinate it to some external authority. Furthermore, it is now
    time that the fundamental relationship between man and woman be
    reordered, that outmoded role expectations be overturned and that
    complete equality of opportunity be accorded women on all levels
    and in all fields. The fact that the Church, as the particularly
    conservative institution that she is, might not go along with this line
    of thinking would certainly not be surprising. If the Church,
    however, would wish to promote human freedom, then ultimately
    730 Joseph Ratzinger
    she will be obliged to set aside the theological justification of old
    social taboos, and the most timely and vital sign of such a desire at
    the present moment would be her consent to the ordination of
    women to the priesthood.
    The roots of this opposition continue to emerge in various
    forms and make it clear that what we are dealing with in our
    imaginary but quite pointed litany is nothing less than a very
    coherent reorientation.
    Its key concepts present themselves in the words “conscience” and “freedom,” which are supposed to confer the aura of
    morality upon changed norms of behavior that at first glance would
    be plainly labelled as a surrender of moral integrity, the simplifications of a lax conscience.
    No longer is conscience understood as that knowledge
    which derives from a higher form of knowing. It is instead the
    individual’s self-determination which may not be directed by
    someone else, a determination by which each person decides for
    himself what is moral in a given situation.
    The concept “norm”—or what is even worse, the moral law
    itself—takes on negative shades of dark intensity: an external rule
    may supply models for direction but it can in no case serve as the
    ultimate arbiter of one’s obligation. Where such thinking holds
    sway, the relationship of man to his body necessarily changes too.
    This change is described as a liberation, when compared to the
    relationship obtaining until now, like an opening up to a freedom
    long unknown. The body then comes to be considered as a
    possession which a person can make use of in whatever way seems
    to him most helpful in attaining “quality of life.” The body is
    something that one has and that one uses. No longer does man
    expect to receive a message from his bodiliness as to who he is and
    what he should do, but definitely, on the basis of his reasonable
    deliberations and with complete independence, he expects to do
    with it as he wishes. In consequence, there is indeed no difference
    whether the body be of the masculine or the feminine sex, the body
    no longer expresses being at all, on the contrary, it has become a
    piece of property. It may be that man’s temptation has always lain in
    the direction of such control and the exploitation of goods. At its
    roots, however, this way of thinking first became an actual possibility through the fundamental separation—not a theoretical but a
    practical and constantly practiced separation—of sexuality and
    Difficulties Confronting the Faith in Europe Today 731
    procreation. This separation was introduced with the pill and has
    been brought to its culmination by genetic engineers so that man
    can now “make” human beings in the laboratory. The material for
    doing this has to be procured by actions deliberately carried out for
    the sake of the planned results which no longer involve interpersonal
    human bonds and decisions in any way. Indeed, where this kind of
    thinking has been completely adopted, the difference between
    homosexuality and heterosexuality as well as that between sexual
    relations within or outside marriage have become unimportant.
    Likewise divested of every metaphysical symbolism is the distinction
    between man and woman, which is to be regarded as the product of
    reinforced role expectations.
    It would be interesting to follow in detail this revolutionary
    vision about man which has appeared behind our rather haphazardly
    concocted litany of objections to the Church’s teaching. Without a
    doubt this will be one of the principal challenges for anthropological
    reflection in coming years. This reflection will have to sort out
    meticulously where quite meaningful corrections to traditional
    notions appear and where there begins a truly fundamental opposition to faith’s vision of man, an opposition that admits no possibility
    of compromise but places squarely before us the alternative of
    believing or not. Such reflection cannot be conducted in a context
    which is more interested in discerning the questions which we have
    to pose for ourselves today than in looking for the answers. Let us
    leave off this dispute for now; our question instead must be, how
    does it happen that values which presuppose such a background have
    become current among Christians?
    It has become quite evident at the present time that our
    litany of objections does not turn upon a few isolated conflicts over
    this or that sacramental practice in the Church, nor is it over the
    extended application of this or that rule. Each of these controversies
    rests upon a much more far-reaching change of “paradigms,” that is,
    of the basic ideas of being and of human obligation. This is the case
    even if only a small number of those who mouth the words of our
    litany would be aware of the change involved.
    They all breathe in, so to speak, the atmosphere of this
    particular vision of man and the world which convinces them of the
    plausibility of this one opinion while removing other views from
    consideration. Who would not be for conscience and freedom and
    against legalism and constraint? Who wishes to be put into the
    732 Joseph Ratzinger
    position of defending taboos? If the questions are framed in this way,
    the faith proclaimed by the Magisterium is already manoeuvred into
    a hopeless position. It collapses all by itself because it loses its
    plausibility according to the thought patterns of the modern world,
    and is looked upon by progressive contemporaries as something that
    has been long superseded.
    We can then give a meaningful answer to the questions
    raised, only if we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into the
    battle over details and are able instead to express the logic of the
    faith in its integrity, the good sense and reasonableness of its view of
    reality and life. We can give a proper answer to the conflicts in
    detail only if we keep all the relationships in view. It is their
    disappearance which has robbed the Faith of its reasonableness.
    In this context, I would like to list three areas within the
    world-view of the Faith which have witnessed a certain kind of
    reduction in the last centuries, a reduction which has been gradually
    preparing the way for another “paradigm.”
  1. In the first place, we have to point out the almost
    complete disappearance of the doctrine on creation from theology.
    As typical instances, we may cite two compendia of modern
    theology in which the doctrine on creation is eliminated as part of
    the content of the faith and is replaced by vague considerations from
    existential philosophy, the 1973 edition of the ecumenical “Neues
    Glaubensbuch” published by J. Feiner and L. Vischer, and the basic
    catechetical work published in Paris in 1984, “La foi des
    catholiques.” In a time when we are experiencing the agonizing of
    creation against man’s work and when the question of the limits and
    standards of creation upon our activity has become the central
    problem of our ethical responsibility, this fact must appear quite
    strange. Notwithstanding all this, it remains always a disagreeable
    fact that “nature” should be viewed as a moral issue. An anxious and
    unreasonable reaction against technology is also closely associated
    with the inability to discern a spiritual message in the material world.
    Nature still appears as an irrational form even while evincing
    mathematical structures which we can study technically. That nature
    has a mathematical intelligibility is to state the obvious, the assertion
    that it also contains in itself a moral intelligibility, however, is
    rejected as metaphysical fantasy. The demise of metaphysics goes
    hand in hand with the displacement of the teaching on creation.
    Difficulties Confronting the Faith in Europe Today 733
    Their place has been taken by a philosophy of evolution (which I
    would like to distinguish from the scientific hypothesis of evolution). This philosophy intends to discard the laws of nature so that
    the management of its development may make a better life possible.
    Nature, which ought really to be the teacher along this path, is
    instead a blind mistress, combining by unwitting chance what man
    is supposed to simulate now with full consciousness. His relationship
    to nature (which is, to be sure, no creation) remains that of one who
    acts upon it; it is in no way that of a learner. It persists as a relationship of domination, then, resting upon the presumption that rational
    calculation may be as clever as “evolution” and can therefore lift the
    world to new heights. The process of development up to this point
    had to struggle along without human intervention.
    Conscience, to which appeal is made, is essentially mute, just
    as nature, the teacher, is blind, it just computes which action holds
    the best chances for betterment. This can (and should, according to
    the logic of the point of departure) occur in a collective way, for
    what is needed is a party which, as the vanguard of history, takes
    evolution in hand while exacting the absolute subordination of the
    individual to it. Otherwise, things occur individualistically and
    conscience then becomes the expression of the subject’s autonomy
    which, in terms of the grand world picture, can only seem absurd
    arrogance.
    It is quite obvious that none of these solutions is helpful, and
    this is the basis for the deep desperation of mankind today, a
    desperation which hides behind an official façade of optimism.
    Nevertheless there is still a silent awareness of the need of an
    alternative to lead us out of the blind alleys of our plausibilities, and
    perhaps there is also, more than we think, a silent hope that a
    renewed Christianity may supply the alternative. This can be
    accomplished, however, only if the teaching on creation is developed anew. Such an undertaking, then, ought to be regarded as one
    of the most pressing tasks of theology today.
    We have to make evident once more what is meant by the
    world’s having been created “in wisdom” and that God’s creative act
    is something quite other than the “bang” of a primeval explosion.
    Only then can conscience and norm enter again into proper
    relationship. For then it will become clear that conscience is not
    some individualistic (or collective) calculation; rather it is a “consciens,” a “knowing along with” creation and, through creation,
    734 Joseph Ratzinger
    with God the Creator. Then, too, it will be rediscovered that man’s
    greatness does not lie in the miserable autonomy of proclaiming
    himself his one and only master, but in the fact that his being allows
    the highest wisdom, truth itself, to shine through. Then it will
    become clear that man is so much the greater the more he is capable
    of hearing the profound message of creation, the message of the
    Creator. And then it will be apparent how harmony with creation,
    whose wisdom becomes our norm, does not mean a limitation upon
    our freedom but is rather an expression of our reason and our
    dignity. Then the body also is given its due honor: it is no longer
    something “used,” but is the temple of authentic human dignity
    because it is God’s handiwork in the world. Then is the equal
    dignity of man and woman made manifest precisely in the fact that
    they are different. One will then begin to understand once again that
    their bodiliness reaches the metaphysical depths and is the basis of a
    symbolic metaphysics whose denial or neglect does not ennoble man
    but destroys him.
  2. The decline of the doctrine on creation includes the
    decline of metaphysics, man’s imprisonment in the empirical, as we
    have said. When this occurs, however, there is also of necessity a
    weakening of Christology. The Word who was in the beginning
    quite disappears. Creative wisdom is no longer a theme for reflection. Inevitably the figure of Jesus Christ, deprived of its metaphysical dimension, is reduced to a purely historical Jesus, to an “empirical” Jesus, who, like every empirical fact, contains only what is
    capable of happening. The central title of his dignity, “Son,”
    becomes void where the path to the metaphysical is cut off. Even
    this title becomes meaningless since there is no longer a theology of
    being sons of God, for it is replaced by the notion of autonomy.
    The relationship of Jesus with God is now expressed in terms
    such as “representative” or the like, but as regards what this means,
    one must seek an answer by the reconstruction of the “historical
    Jesus.”
    There are today two principal models for the alleged figure
    of the historical Jesus: the bourgeois-liberal and the Marxistrevolutionary. Jesus was either the herald of a liberal morality,
    struggling against every kind of “legalism” and its representatives; or
    he was a subversive who can be considered as the deification of the
    class struggle and its religious symbolic figure.
    Difficulties Confronting the Faith in Europe Today 735
    Evident in the background are the two aspects of the
    modern notion of freedom, which are seen embodied in Jesus; this
    is what makes him God’s representative. The unmistakable symptom
    of the present decline of Christology is the disappearance of the
    Cross and, consequently, the meaninglessness of the Resurrection,
    of the Paschal Mystery. In the liberal model, the Cross is an
    accident, a mistake, the result of short-sighted legalism. It cannot
    therefore be made the subject of theological speculation; indeed it
    really should not have occurred and a proper liberalism makes it in
    any event superfluous.
    In the second model Jesus is the failed revolutionary. He can
    now symbolize the suffering of the oppressed class and thus foster
    the growth of class consciousness. From this viewpoint the Cross can
    even be given a certain sense, an important meaning, but one which
    is radically opposed to the witness of the New Testament.
    Now in both these versions there runs a common thread,
    namely, that we must be saved not through the Cross, but from the
    Cross. Atonement and forgiveness are misunderstandings from
    which Christianity has to be freed. The two fundamental points of
    the Christian faith of the New Testament writers and of the Church
    in every age (the divine sonship understood in a metaphysical sense
    and the Paschal Mystery) are eliminated or at least bereft of any
    function. It is obvious that with such a basic reinterpretation all the
    rest of Christianity is likewise altered—the understanding of what
    the Church is, the liturgy, spirituality, etc.
    Naturally these crude denials, which I have described here
    with all the severity of their consequences, are seldom spoken of so
    openly. The movements, however, are clear and they do not confine
    themselves to the realm of theology alone. For quite some time they
    have entered into preaching and catechesis; on account of the ease
    of their transmission, they are even more pronounced in these fields
    than in strictly theological literature. Quite clearly, then, the real
    decisions today fall once again in the field of Christology; everything
    else follows from that.
  3. Finally, I should like to refer briefly to a third field of
    theological reflection which is threatened by a thoroughgoing
    reduction of the contents of faith, namely, eschatology. Belief in
    eternal life has hardly any role to play in preaching today. A friend
    of mine, recently deceased, an exegete of note, once told me of
    736 Joseph Ratzinger
    some Lenten sermons he had heard at the beginning of the 1970s.
    In the first sermon, the preacher explained to the faithful that Hell
    does not exist; in the second, Purgatory went the same way; in the
    third, he eventually undertook the difficult task of trying to
    convince his hearers that even Heaven does not exist and that we
    should seek our paradise here on earth. To be sure, it is seldom as
    drastic as that, but diffidence in speaking about the hereafter has
    become commonplace.
    The Marxist accusation that Christians justified the injustices
    of this world with the consolation of the world to come is deeply
    rooted, and the present social problems are now indeed so serious
    that they require all the powers of moral commitment. This moral
    requirement will not at all be called into question by the one who
    views the Christian life in the perspective of eternity, for eternal life
    cannot be prepared for otherwise than in our present existence.
    Nicholas Cabasilas, for example, expressed this truth in a wonderful
    reflection in the fourteenth century. Only those attain to it (that is,
    the future life) who already are its friends and have ears to hear. For
    it is not there that friendship is begun, that the ear is opened, that
    the wedding garment is readied and all else prepared, it is rather this
    present life which is the work place where all this is fashioned. For
    just as nature prepares the embryo, even while it leads a dark and
    confined existence, for living in the light and forms it, as it were,
    according to the pattern of the life that is to come, just so does it
    happen with the saints. Only the exigency of eternal life confers its
    absolute urgency on the moral duty of this life. If, however, heaven
    is only something “ahead” of us and no longer “above” us, then the
    interior tension of human existence and its communal responsibility
    are slackened. For we indeed are not “ahead,” and whether this
    prospect of what is ahead is a heaven for those others who appear to
    us to have gone “ahead,” we are not in a position to determine,
    since they are as free and as subject to temptation as we are ourselves.
    Here we find the deception inherent in the idea of the
    “better world,” which, nonetheless, appears today even among
    Christians as the true goal of our hope and the genuine standard of
    morality. The “Kingdom of God” has been almost completely
    substituted in the general awareness, as far as I can see, by the Utopia
    of a better future world for which we labor and which becomes the
    true reference point of morality—a morality which thus blends again
    Difficulties Confronting the Faith in Europe Today 737
    with a philosophy of evolution and history, and creates norms for
    itself by calculating what can offer better conditions of life.
    I do not deny that it is in just this way that the idealistic
    energies of young people are unleashed and that the results are
    fruitful in terms of new aspirations to selfless activity. As an allembracing norm for human endeavor, however, the future does not
    suffice. Where the Kingdom of God is reduced to the “better
    world” of tomorrow, the present will ultimately assert its rights
    against some imaginary future. The escape into the world of drugs
    is the logical consequence of the idolizing of Utopia. Since this has
    difficulty in arriving, man draws it to himself or throws himself
    headlong into it. It is dangerous, therefore, if the better world
    terminology predominates in prayers and sermons and inadvertently
    replaces the faith with a placebo.

All that has been said here may appear to many to be all too
negative. It was not intended, of course, to describe the situation of
the Church as a whole, with all her positive and negative elements.
It was rather a case of setting out the obstacles to the faith in the
European context.
Within this limited theme, I have not claimed to present an
exhaustive analysis. My sole intention was to examine, beyond the
individual problems which are constantly surfacing, the deepest
motives which give rise to the individual difficulties in ever
changing forms.
Only by learning to understand that fundamental trait of
modern existence which refuses to accept the faith before discussing
all its contents, will we be able to regain the initiative instead of
simply responding to the questions raised. Only then can we reveal
the faith as the alternative which the world awaits after the failure of
the liberalistic and Marxist experiments. This is today’s challenge to
Christianity, herein lies our great responsibility as Christians at the
present time. G
JOSEPH RATZINGER was elected Pope Benedict XVI in 2005

Leave a comment